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Discussant's Response to 
Management Behavior—An Auditing Horizon 
Robert L. Grinaker 
University of Houston 
Although I am pleased to comment on Donald Georgen's paper, I also have 
something of a problem because, to a large extent, I agree with most of the things 
he has to say. It's a little difficult to discuss a paper that I wish I had written 
myself. Hence, I would like my remarks to be considered complementary to, 
rather than critical of, those presented in the paper. M y discussion w i l l be directed 
to the following specific topics: 
A . Under the broad area of auditor's responsibility, I shall make a few 
comments on management fraud and illegal payments. 
B. I shall address the following three additional topics: 
1. Evaluation of traditional auditing procedures. 
2. Understanding the client's business. 
3. Scientific research design—a prototype for auditing procedures. 
Auditor's Responsibility for Management Fraud 
Let me first comment that D o n Georgen makes a very useful distinction be-
tween employee and management fraud. Furthermore, I agree wi th h i m that 
most instances of management fraud are "performance" based rather than involved 
i n the direct theft of assets. However, certain classical cases—notably McKesson-
Robbins—did involve massive thefts of company assets. 
I further agree that the profession is becoming increasingly aware that it has 
significant responsibility for the discovery of management fraud. I also am con-
vinced that this awareness stems principally from public expectations which are 
reflected in actions of regulatory agencies and the courts. The processes appear to 
be by-passing the auditor, thus posing some significant dangers. T o me, the 
danger is that the auditor's responsibility for fraud losses may be completely dis-
associated from financial statements and their fair presentation. In my judgment, 
the only perspective that makes sense in defining the auditor's responsibility for 
fraud is its relationship to the fair presentation of the financial statements. In this 
regard, our professional literature, characterized in the paper as ambiguous, has 
been something less than helpful. Consider the following from AudSEC' s 
Statement on Audi t ing Standards N o . 1: 
In making the ordinary examination, the independent auditor is aware of 
the possibility that fraud may exist. Financial statements may be misstated 
as the result of defalcations and similar irregularities, or deliberate mis-
representations by management, or both. The auditor recognizes that 
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fraud, if sufficiently material, may affect his opinion on the financial state-
ments, and his examination, made in accordance with generally accepted 
auditing standards, gives consideration to this possibility. (§ 110.05) 
The foregoing seems to be a very clear statement right on issue. Fraud is identi-
fied as a source of error and the auditor is aware of the fact that any material 
error, including fraud, can have an impact on the fairness of the financial state-
ments. If this be so, the auditor's opinion and his responsibility are affected. If 
the statement stopped here, I would conclude that the auditor's responsibility for 
fraud is no different than for any other source of misstatement. I could then 
argue with force that, although the auditor must conduct his examination wi th 
due professional care, he is not a guarantor. Hence, despite an examination con-
ducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, material error 
may nevertheless remain undetected. Whether the source of the misstatement is 
fraud or honest error should be irrelevant. 
Unfortunatly, AudSEC' s statement continues, and like negative assurance, the 
meaning of an otherwise clear statement is considerably blunted. The next three 
sentences read as follows: 
However, the ordinary examination directed to the expression of an opinion 
on financial statements is not primarily or specifically designed, and cannot 
be relied upon, to disclose defalcations and other similar irregularities, 
although their discovery may result. Similarly, although the discovery of 
deliberate misrepresentations by management is usually more closely asso-
ciated with the objective of the ordinary examination, such examination 
cannot be relied upon to assure its discovery. The responsibility of the 
independent auditor for failure to detect fraud (which responsibility dif-
fers as to clients and other) arises only when such failure clearly results 
from failure to comply with generally accepted auditing standards. 
What are these latter sentences attempting to say? Are they saying that the auditor 
is not responsible for detecting immaterial fraud? O r , are they saying that the 
auditor's responsibility for detecting error arising from fraud is different than for 
other kinds of error? For example, is the responsibility different i n the case of an 
honest error arising from the failure to account for obsolete inventory compared 
to an error arising from management deceit? If so, the auditor's opinion should 
be redrafted. O n the other hand, the statement may simply be pointing out that 
the auditor is not infallible. Hence, errors of any k ind may remain undetected 
even though the auditor has conducted an examination i n accordance with gen-
erally accepted auditing standards.1 
In any event, the statement as now drafted is ambiguous. Hence, any position 
inferred from this statement may be totally right or totally wrong. A clearer 
statement may not help, but I believe it would have a better chance than the 
current one. 
As to whether the auditor should specifically search for fraud, or any other 
source of error, I would assert that the audit mode should always be applicable to 
the circumstances. I believe that this statement simply generalizes from D o n 
Georgen's position that his firm would audit in the fraud mode only i n warranted 
circumstances—i.e., where the economic and other conditions may be conducive 
toward fraudulent activities. Rightly so, extensive tests are made i n the fraud 
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mode only in those circumstances where fraud is likely. But surely the general 
position also is right; i.e., extensive special tests of any k ind should be warranted 
by the circumstances. For example, if I am auditing a highly technical industry, 
characterized by ever-changing product specifications, I w i l l certainly apply rather 
special, and perhaps costly, tests for inventory obsolescence. Such tests would be 
totally unwarranted in other circumstances. I make this point not to be pedantic, 
but to support the position that fraud should be classified together wi th all other 
possible source of financial statement error. 
The Auditor's Responsibility for Illegal Payments 
W i t h respect to the auditor's responsibility for illegal payments, I hesitate to 
speak other than to confess my confusion. I am not greatly helped by recent 
court decisions or by statements of S E C Chairman H i l l . I could, perhaps, under-
stand the auditor's responsibility if it were related to either of the following 
circumstances: 
a) If failure to disclose such payments would cause financial statements to 
be materially misstated, or 
b) If the auditor had witnessed a crime and the failure to disclose were 
viewed as a conspiracy to cover-up. 
Thus, I find myself in agreement with D o n Georgen that our responsibilities in 
this area remain unclear. In the meantime, I believe his firm's position is exactly 
appropriate—i.e., audit i n the "illegal payment mode" i n those circumstances 
where illegal payments are likely to have occurred. 
Evaluation of Traditional Auditing Procedures 
In any consideration of the auditor's responsibility for the discovery of fraud, 
traditional auditing procedures warrant some attention. A number of traditional 
auditing procedures are directed to fraud detection. For example, since 1940, as 
the consequence of a classic case of massive management fraud, at least a portion 
of almost every audit is conducted in the fraud mode. In my judgment, a critical 
review of traditional auditing procedures would prove fruitful in suggesting 
modifications which could materially enhance the probability of discovering man-
agement fraud. I would like to use confirmation procedures as a caged example. 
In discussing auditing procedures, we often speak of independent confirma-
tion, i n which we represent that testimony is communicated directly from an 
independent third party to the auditor. T o assure such independence, we take 
some pains with the processes involved. As a personal indication of these con-
cerns, I once received some pointed criticism as a young auditor from a partner 
who observed my intention to mai l out confirmation letters i n the client's enve-
lopes. Never—before or since—have I heard such a lucid explanation of the 
importance of assuring independence i n the confirmation process. N o w , i n the 
Equity Funding case, we find revealed another significant "hole" in the process 
of independent confirmation. Although Equity Funding was replete with ques-
tionable auditing, the case also contains some significant lessons. 
Y o u w i l l recall i n the case that the auditor attempted to confirm the existence 
of securities i n the custody of a bank. However, he got burned by a very simple 
27 
ploy, totally unrelated to such traditional controls as "using the right envelopes" 
or "delivering of confirmation requests directly to the postal authorities." The 
special A I C P A Committee investigating Equity Funding describes the ploy as 
follows: 
A t the end of 1972 the auditors' request for confirmation of certain securi-
ties represented as being held i n safekeeping by the bank was addressed by 
company personnel to a mail drop set up under a name similar to the bank 
so company personnel would receive the request, sign the confirmation and 
return it to the auditors.2 
I wonder, are traditional auditing procedures adequate with respect to this matter? 
The special committee concluded on the issue with the following statement: 
Whi le this points up the need for auditors to ascertain that valid addresses 
are used, such a step is already a customary and integral part of confirma-
tion procedures.3 
Frankly, I would like to see the empirical evidence which supports the foregoing 
conclusion. M y own evidence, while admittedly limited and informally gathered, 
indicates that tests of the validity of confirmation addresses generally is limited to 
data contained in the client's records. If so, I suggest that such tests are inade-
quate to assure independent confirmation. 
In summary, based on my admittedly caged example, I suggest that traditional 
auditing procedures be subjected to continuing critical review on two fronts: 
first, we should test the logical connection between each l ink in the evidential 
chain, and second, we should study subsequently discovered misstatements not 
revealed in the auditing process. If auditing weaknesses are revealed, normal 
audit procedures should be corrected. 
Understanding the Client's Business 
A so-called "through the business approach" has been discussed in auditing 
literature, and particularly by Touche, for a number of years. I am pleased to note 
that the client investigation routine discussed by M r . Georgen places special em-
phasis on "understanding the client's business." I have come to believe that 
thorough prerequisite knowledge of the client's business is absolutely essential to 
effective auditing and, hence, to the discovery of material error—whether the 
source is fraud or an honest mistake. 
M y conviction on this point finds clear support i n philosophical literature 
dealing with the theory of knowledge. Marhenke states as follows, " Y o u cannot 
devise an observation test unti l you know the meaning of the sentence you are 
going to test."4 For example, with respect to auditing, consider the following 
sentence: "The inventory value on the balance sheet is fairly stated." T o test this 
sentence, the auditor must know not only the general meaning of inventory and 
inventory accounting, but also the special environment i n which this particular 
inventory is contained. Many special problems such as identification, physical 
condition, or obsolescence may be involved. If such special problems do exist, 
they form part of the meaning of the sentence to be tested. 
In discussing the nature of scientific inquiry, Susan Stebbing reinforces the 
point wi th the following statement: 
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A n examination of the examples we have given shows that a considerable 
amount of previous knowledge relevant to the situation is required before 
a problem can even be stated. Still more knowledge is required i n order 
that fruitful suggestions as to its solution should occur to the thinker. 5 
One may rightfully question why I am belaboring such an obvious point. 
Consider the following statement by the S E C i n A S R N o . 173 issued in July, 1975: 
Another lesson appears . . . where the auditors accepted assertions by man-
agement concerning the special circumstances of the business involved 
although presentation of the supposed results presented unusual accounting 
and auditing problems. In considerable measure this occurred because the 
auditors were not sufficiendy familiar wi th the business context to assess 
the representations of management. Auditors should be particularly careful 
when the client asserts that special circumstances require unusual account-
ing or auditing solutions and should either possess or avail themselves of 
sufficient industry knowledge to judge the substance of the situation. 
In A S R N o . 174, under a caption entitled " H F K ' s Understanding of Stirling 
Homex's Business" is the following statement: 
H F K , i n the opinion of the Commission did not fully understand the 
funding provisions applicable to Stirling Homex's operations under the 
H U D turnkey program and did not seek such advice. 
As was asserted by the S E C i n these two ASR's , failure to understand the client's 
business accounted for the failure to obtain competent evidence from which appro-
priate inferences could be drawn. More fundamentally, the auditors in these 
cases could not devise the proper observation tests because either (1) they did not 
know the meaning of the sentences they were trying to test, or (2) they did not 
know enough even to formulate appropriate propositions to be tested. 
In my judgment, prerequisite knowledge of the client's business is so funda-
mental to inquiry that steps should be taken to assure that such knowledge per-
vades the entire audit team. M u c h prerequisite knowledge is provided to younger 
staff members by recent university education and i n follow-on staff training pro-
grams. However, I wonder how many staff training programs are directed to 
specific industries and specific clients. I assert that inclusion of such programs i n 
the training budgets of accounting firms would be cost-beneficial. Although I 
have no evidence i n support of my assertion, I believe the concept can and should 
be empirically tested. 
Scientific Research Design—A Prototype for Auditing Procedures 
Georgen points out i n his paper that auditing procedures—particularly those 
procedures directed to the discovery of management fraud—are i n the develop-
ment state. As a matter of fact, all human knowledge is tentative and, hence, is 
subject to continuing mid-course corrections. Auditors w i l l continue to learn 
both from past mistakes and from research. As we learn more, auditing procedures 
w i l l continue to become more effective i n the discovery of fraud and other error. 
Experience, of course, is a great teacher. As some sage so wisely stated, "Foo l 
me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me." The SAS's are replete with 
auditing lessons learned from experience. However, the lessons of experience are 
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often bitter pills to swallow. Hopefully, therefore, we w i l l come, more and more, 
to rely on research for the development of auditing procedures. Research already 
has proved fruitful in the development of opinion modifications, understanding 
the application of statistical inference to auditing, and understanding the impact 
of the behavioral sciences on auditing. 
Compared to most other disciplines which evolve through research, auditing 
is unique in that a significant portion of the discipline itself comprises a system 
of inquiry. Thus, the principles of scientific research design stand as a ready-
made prototype for the investigative aspects of auditing. In my judgment, a 
significant positive step i n the development of auditing procedures would be 
recognition of this relationship by an authoritative professional body—say, 
A u d S E C . 
Every developing discipline has found that its problems begin to yield solu-
tions when the methods of organized inquiry are applied. We are just beginning 
to tackle accounting and auditing problems i n this fashion. Despite the many 
difficulties involved i n getting started, a number of problems are yielding solu-
tions. In my judgment, one of the blessings of the current high demand for 
accounting education is the concurrent demand for accounting doctorates—young 
people specifically trained to be researchers. The important point for auditing as 
a discipline is that research education implies the existence of a body of knowledge 
specifically about the research process. Because auditors, like trained researchers, 
are involved i n a system of inquiry, I assert that, i f all auditors were specifically 
trained i n the general methods of research design, auditing procedures and their 
ability to detect fraud and error would be significantly improved. Although I 
have no evidence to support my assertion, I am convinced that the concept can 
and should be empirically tested. 
In Summary 
In summary I would suggest the following: 
1. Fraud (and perhaps illegal payments) should be viewed by the profession 
as simply another possible source of financial statement error wi th re-
sponsibility and consequences no different than for any other source of 
error. Auditors would then be i n a better position to address with force 
the questions of due professional care vs. professional infallibility. 
2. So-called traditional auditing procedures should be subject to continuing 
review for logical "holes." Such review should assure maximum effec-
tiveness of normal auditing procedures to detect fraud and other errors. 
3. Thorough understanding of the client's business is an essential prerequi-
site to effective auditing and, hence, to the detection of fraud and other 
error. I further suggest that staff training be geared to developing the 
means of obtaining such an understanding by every member of the 
audit team. 
4. Because auditing is a system of inquiry, scientific research design should 
be adopted as a prototype for the investigative aspects of auditing. I 
further suggest that all auditors be trained i n the fundamentals of 
research design. 
Footnotes 
1. In May, 1976, A u d S E C announced the issuance of an exposure draft entitled The Inde-
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pendent Auditor's Responsibility for the Detection of Errors or Irregularities. The questions 
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2. Report of the Special Committee on Equity Funding, American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants, 1975, p. 23. 
3. Ibid., p. 32. 
4. Paul Marhenke, "The Criterion of Significance," Meaning and Knowledge: Systematic 
Readings in Epistemology, Edited by Ernest Nagel and Richard B. Brandt, Harcourt, Brace & 
World, Inc., New York, 1965, p. 35. 
5. L . Susan Stebbing, A Modern Introduction to Logic, Harper & Row, New York, 1961, 
p. 238. 
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